WAR, CITIZENSHIP, TERRITORY

EDITED BY DEBORAH COWEN AND EMILY GILBERT
WAR,
CITIZENSHIP,
TERRITORY
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Disaster response in the United States traditionally has been handled by state and local governments, with the federal government playing a supporting role. Limits on the federal government’s role in disaster response are deeply rooted in American tradition. State and local governments—who know the unique requirements of their citizens and geography and are best positioned to respond to incidents in their own jurisdictions—will always play a large role in disaster response. The federal government’s supporting role respects these practical points and the sovereignty of the states as well as the power of governors to direct activities and coordinate efforts within their states.

*The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (White House 2006, 11)*

Recent events (White House 2006, 11) such as the attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina have raised basic questions concerning the spatial and political logic of government in the United States: how should the government respond to a complex field of threats—such as natural disasters, terrorism, and pandemic disease—across national space? And what are the obligations of the government to individuals and communities in anticipating and responding to potentially catastrophic events?¹

In this chapter, we situate these questions within an “American tradition” for identifying and managing perceived threats to collective security. In fact, as we will show, this “tradition” rests on a relatively recent set of developments: the invention of an organizational framework and set of techniques that we call “distributed preparedness.”

Distributed preparedness was initially articulated in civil defense programs in the early stages of the Cold War, when U.S. government planners began to conceptualize the nation as a possible target of nuclear attack. They assumed that the enemy would focus its attacks on urban and industrial centers that were essential to U.S. war-fighting capability. Distributed preparedness pro-
vided techniques for mapping national space as a field of potential targets, and
grafted this map of vulnerabilities onto the structure of territorial administra-
tion in the United States. It presented a new model of coordinated planning
for catastrophic threats, one that sought to limit federal intervention in local
life and to preserve the characteristic features of American federalism.

The first section of the chapter places the emergence of distributed pre-
paredness in the broader context of civil defense planning and post–World
War II national security strategy. With the emergence of strategic bombing
and total war, planners increasingly viewed the cities, industry, and popula-
tion of the United States as possible targets of nuclear attack. Civil defense was
organized to ensure that, if attacked, the nation could fight back. In this sense,
distributed preparedness was one part of the continual mobilization for war
that characterized the Cold War national security state.

The following sections take up two dimensions of distributed preparedness
that were initially developed in the context of civil defense planning, but that
have had enduring importance beyond this context. We call these “emergency
federalism” and “vulnerability mapping.” Emergency federalism is an organi-
zational framework for coordinating autonomous sovereign entities through
joint planning during normal times and unified command in the case of
emergencies. As a model for how local, state, and federal governments can
respond together to events that exceed local capacities, emergency federalism
can be understood as a “state spatial form”—that is, in Brenner’s description,
a way to “integrate state institutions and policy regimes across geographical
scales and among different locales within the state’s territory” (Brenner 2004,
91). Vulnerability mapping, meanwhile, refers to a set of techniques and pro-
cedures for mapping urban areas as sites of potential catastrophe. Vulnerabil-
ity mapping makes it possible to assess required response capacities, and the
weaknesses in those capacities, so that planners can direct their efforts toward
them. In combining these two elements, distributed preparedness grafts a
spatial understanding of vulnerability onto the federal structure of the United
States, creating a distinctive political logic for identifying and managing per-
ceived threats to collective life.

Our discussion is based on an analysis of some of the key documents in
which distributed preparedness was articulated. We focus in particular on
two of these: first, the 1950 report United States Civil Defense, the so-called
blue book that was the foundation for the 1951 Civil Defense Act; and, second,
a 1953 manual entitled Civil Defense Urban Analysis, produced by the Federal
Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). By focusing on these technical docu-
ments, our aim is not to assess the extent to which plans were reflected in a
subsequent reality, a question that has been taken up in a number of studies
on civil defense (Blanchard 1986; Fehr 1999; Grossman 2001; Lee 2001;
Tyler 1967). Rather, our goal is to characterize distributed preparedness as a
distinctive political logic, and to consider its implications for contemporary
discussions of security.2

In the context of the Cold War, distributed preparedness was a response to
the exigency of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. But both the spe-
cific techniques developed in civil defense planning and the overall model of
distributed preparedness have since migrated to other institutional contexts
where they have been deployed to address threats other than nuclear attack:
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the rise of “all-
hazards planning” for disaster response in the 1970s; planning for pandemic
disease by local, state, and federal public health agencies; and, most recently,
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—in which terrorist attacks
have been added to the list of potential catastrophes that are to be managed
through distributed preparedness.

The final section of the chapter reflects briefly on this diffusion of distrib-
uted preparedness, and on its significance for the critical analysis of contem-
porary security. Much critical scholarship has understood recent government
security measures in terms of a process of “militarization.” Through reference
to examples such as the USA PATRIOT Act, extrajudicial handling of terror
suspects, and urban security measures, this scholarship argues that the civil-
ian sphere of autonomous rights is being curtailed, and that domestic space is
being partitioned through limitations on access, movement, and legal protec-
tions. Its diagnosis is that we are faced with an encroaching and increasingly
oppressive security apparatus. Meanwhile, the constant refrain in most public
discussion of security threats is that we are not secure enough.

Our approach differs from both of these positions. It does not begin with
the question of whether there is currently “too much” or “too little” security.
Rather, it initially asks, What type of security is being discussed? And what are
its political implications? As Nyers (2004) points out, “[A]n important means
by which sovereign states have historically claimed legitimacy is through the
provision of security and protection to their citizens.” But the relationship
between security and citizenship in a given context can only be understood by
asking questions such as: how are threats defined within a given political logic
of security? And how is responsibility for the provision of security defined and
distributed among various levels of government?

The norms, techniques, and practices of distributed preparedness tend to
fall below the radar of much critical scholarship on security. This is at least in
part because these practices are ubiquitous and mostly taken for granted—
they hold the status of an unexamined common sense. But this common sense
is based on a historically situated logic of security, one that involves a distinc-
tive way of imagining threats and vulnerabilities, and of preparing for and
responding to a certain category of events. The task of this chapter, then, is to
help understand how this logic has become common sense; how experts, politi-
cians, pundits, and key figures in the media learned to think and speak in
a certain way about “security” problems; and how a diverse range of possible events—natural disasters, pandemic diseases, and terrorist attacks—came to be seen as part of the same class of security threats, and as manageable through the same set of techniques.

**Distributed Preparedness, Civil Defense, and National Security**

The articulation of distributed preparedness in Cold War civil defense planning was closely linked to a series of political and technological developments that transformed strategic thinking about warfare in the United States and Europe over the first half of the twentieth century. The rise of total war meant that the entire industrial capacity of a country was regarded as critical to its war effort, thus blurring the lines between civilian and military facilities, and making civilian installations and populations into military targets. Meanwhile, the increasing centrality of airpower meant that this expanded range of military targets could be directly and suddenly attacked. And with the dawn of the nuclear age, the impact of a surprise air attack would be devastating.

One important aspect of this broader shift in military strategy was the emergence of “strategic bombing,” an approach that was reflected in U.S. Air Force doctrine before World War II and put into practice by the United States and Britain in the air war in Germany and Japan. Strategic bombing did not focus on “theater operations”—that is, attacks on enemy deployments. Rather, it targeted facilities that were crucial to an enemy’s capacity to conduct industrial warfare. In particular, strategic bombing focused on the critical vulnerabilities of industrial production chains—the “vital links that if targeted would bring the system to a halt” (McMullen 2001, 8).

Post–World War II civil defense efforts were, in some sense, the defensive counterpart of strategic bombing doctrine. As Galison (2001) notes, U.S. strategists began to see national territory from the vantage of an enemy in a total war—as a space of potential targets. The question was how, in an air-nuclear age, to organize the home front to prepare for nuclear attack.

The basic argument for establishing a comprehensive, national civil defense program was established in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS; 1947), a massive effort to assess bomb damage in Japan, Germany, and Britain, conducted in the immediate aftermath of World War II. In the course of investigating bomb damage, the USSBS also examined and assessed the civil defense efforts of these countries. It found that civil defense could be an important tool in mitigating the effects of urban bombing campaigns, and in maintaining an ongoing capacity to wage war in the face of attack.

Based on these findings, the USSBS concluded that a concerted national effort at civil defense planning was necessary. This conclusion was echoed in a series of subsequent reports, which more or less repeated the broad recommendations of the survey, and which began to elaborate a systematic approach to civil defense planning in the United States. The planning process culmi-
nated in a 1950 report entitled *United States Civil Defense* (U.S. National Security Resources Board [NSRB] 1950). *United States Civil Defense* was a pivotal document that laid the groundwork for the 1951 Civil Defense Act—which in turn created the FCDA—and it remained a basic reference for civil defense planners in the years that followed. More broadly, the document laid out a new model that would subsequently be adopted in a range of other contexts for managing “emergency” situations.

It is noteworthy that *United States Civil Defense* was produced by the NSRB, which had been created, along with the National Security Council, in the defense reorganization of 1947. The purpose of these organizations was to align the work of nonmilitary agencies in the government with the demands of an emerging concept of “national security.” This concept of national security increasingly oriented both military and nonmilitary agencies in the government to ongoing war mobilization, in order to defend against what was perceived as a broad external threat to national existence.

The approach articulated in *United States Civil Defense* was firmly situated in this emerging national security doctrine. Civil defense, it argued, was “a missing element in our system of national security” in an air-nuclear age in which the United States was vulnerable to “a sudden devastating attack” (NSRB 1950, 5). The document’s justification for civil defense was primarily military. “The outcome of two world wars,” it noted,

> has been decided by the weight of American industrial production in support of a determined fighting force. In any future war, it is probable that an enemy would attempt at the outset to destroy or cripple the production capacity of the United States and to carry direct attack against civilian communities to disrupt support of the war effort. (NSRB 1950, 8)

Following the assumptions of strategic bombing doctrine, the report assumed that an attack would manage to strike critical targets in the United States. The question, then, was whether such an attack “would succeed in destroying America’s productive power” (NSRB 1950, 5). Success, in turn, “would depend in the main on the organization and functional efficiency of the country’s civil defense” (NSRB 1950, 5). These general assumptions pointed to a series of practical questions: How should planners conceptualize the United States as a target space? What kinds of preparations would be appropriate for meeting this threat? And who should be responsible for organizing them?

The answer to this set of questions, as laid out in *United States Civil Defense* and a range of other planning documents, was the framework and set of techniques for coordinated planning and response that we call “distributed preparedness.” By “distributed,” we mean that responsibility was delegated to different levels of government, and to both public and private agencies, according to their competencies and capacities, and according to their spatial relationship to a critical target. By “preparedness,” we indicate a form of
planning for unpredictable but potentially catastrophic events—intended not to prevent these events from happening, but rather to manage their consequences (Lakoff 2007; Collier and Lakoff 2006).

In the context of civil defense, many of the details of distributed preparedness were specific to the exigencies of nuclear confrontation—such as the techniques for envisioning the impact of a nuclear strike on a city, which we describe below. But the broader model of distributed preparedness—and the practices and organizational forms it entailed—had longer term significance outside of the context of nuclear confrontation. The discussion that follows examines two of these: emergency federalism and vulnerability mapping. Emergency federalism was developed as an organizational framework for coordinated planning and response among autonomous local governments and private actors in the United States’ system of distributed sovereignty. Vulnerability mapping involved a set of techniques for identifying likely targets of nuclear bombing, and assessing the impact of nuclear blasts that made it possible—by imaginatively enacting an attack—to pinpoint weaknesses in civil defense preparations and to direct the resources and efforts of civil defense planners.

**Autonomy, Economy, and Coordination: Emergency Federalism**

The question of who would take responsibility for civil defense planning in the post–World War II United States was initially a contentious one. The military, which had been involved in civil defense preparations during and immediately after the war, consistently opposed adding civil defense functions to its basic responsibilities. By the late 1940s there was a broad consensus that civil defense planning should be a civilian endeavor (see the discussion in Lee 2001, ch. 2). But the prospect of civilian administration raised a number of problems that reflected broader tensions in the postwar United States about the growth of the federal government.

The New Deal had dramatically expanded the scope of federal intervention into the social and economic life of the national population. The new federal prerogatives were opposed by conservatives committed to principles of self-reliance and local government as fundamental characteristics of the American political system. These tensions shaped debates about the U.S. state during and then after World War II. As Hogan (1998) has shown in a detailed political history of the period, Truman and many liberal Democrats assumed that declining military expenditures would allow increases in social welfare programs, including a national health service. Conservative Republicans, who opposed expanded social programs and a larger central government, agreed that military expenditures should decline, but thought that the peace dividend should pay for tax cuts.

The political divisions that formed around the conflicting priorities of social welfare and tax cuts were reframed by the international crises of the late 1940s, including the Soviet atomic bomb test and developments in Korea.
These events pushed political opinion toward an emerging consensus around a “national security state” and, consequently, around a dramatic expansion of military expenditures to maintain continual mobilization and war preparedness in the face of the Soviet threat (Hogan 1998; Yergin 1977).

This consensus required concessions on both sides, although within a framework that allowed each to hold to some core beliefs (see, e.g., Gold 1977; Hogan 1998; Waddell 1999). Conservatives made concessions to an enlarged federal government, in part on the condition that the basis of its growth would not be welfare programs or intervention in the economy, but rather military-related spending. Liberal Democrats, meanwhile, yielded in their aspirations for bold new social welfare programs, in part on the understanding that military spending would act as an economic stimulus and, thus, an instrument for positive government economic policy. What emerged was a model of “Cold War liberalism.”9 It was based on what Gold has called a “military-Keynesian consensus,” realized by “pushing Keynesianism toward an emphasis on economic growth and making growth itself dependent upon the military and private production, not on social spending” (1977, 136–37).10 As Hogan puts the point, the broad shift was decisively away from a “welfare” state toward a “warfare” state, though one that, through interventions in aggregate demand, did play a role in promoting economic growth.

In the context of this early Cold War liberal consensus, civil defense was in an awkward position. On the one hand, it was considered by many to be crucial to national security. On the other hand, in contrast to military buildup, civil defense moved back into the realm of domestic questions such as welfare, public health, and local police and fire services that conservatives wanted to defend against incursions by the federal government. Moreover, a national program of civil defense might limit the independence of state governments, local governments, community-level coordinators, and industrial plants—all of which had to be involved in civil defense planning. The prospect of a national civil defense program, therefore, raised questions about the basic terms of the Cold War liberal consensus: about the autonomy of local governments and individuals, about federal intrusion in the organization of collective life, and about the expansion of government budgets required to implement civil defense programs.11 It also raised questions concerning the basic bargain of citizenship: what was the scope of government responsibility in providing security? And what limitations on individual and local autonomy would have to be accepted in the name of collective security?

These political questions were directly related to the organizational basis of civil defense. As the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey had discovered, civil defense worked well in cases where there were both principles of local “self-protection” and clear hierarchical command and control. Thus, on the one hand, the survey noted that in German civil defense,
The individual was trained to take care of himself, protect his property, and join with a few others in a small group under a warden to help others to do likewise when the task was too great for them to bear alone. This training of the individual in self-protection and the feeling of confidence he had that all would be done that could be done kept alive a strong spirit in civilian defense forces which, in no small measure, was responsible for the fact that the home front did not collapse. (USSBS 1947, 13)

At the same time, the survey noted, “The control exercised by the German regular police from the national level through the local level made for simplicity of control and command. The emergency created by war in civilian communities requires concentration of authority” (1947, 13). But what organization in the U.S. governmental structure could provide both self-protection and centralized control simultaneously? And how could this combination of self-protection and centralized control be reconciled with the distributed sovereignties of U.S. federalism? Or with concerns about the expansion of federal spending and federal bureaucracies?

*United States Civil Defense* (1950) explicitly acknowledged these problems at the outset. The report noted that with the expansion of the military that had accelerated in 1949, “the drain upon America's resources [would] necessarily be great” (NSRB 1950, 3). Therefore, plans for civil defense had to be made “with full recognition of the importance of maximum economy in the use of the available supply of men, money, and materials” (NSRB 1950, 3). Likewise, the report was self-conscious about the need to avoid infringing upon the sovereignties of states, localities, families, and individuals. And it repeatedly noted that local governments were in a better position than the federal government to respond to local problems:

[T]he States are established with inherent powers and accompanying responsibility, and have clear qualifications to coordinate civil defense operations within their boundaries, and in emergency to direct them. Similarly, the cities, countries, and towns are best qualified to handle their own operating functions. (NSRB 1950, 5)

The solution to these tensions between centralization and decentralization, between the collective demand for organizing for civil defense and the presumptive priority given to local sovereignties, was the formulation of an organizational framework that we call “emergency federalism.” Emergency federalism recognized that preparation for enemy attack on critical civilian targets was a problem of national security and, therefore, related to the core functions of the federal government. But it sought to minimize, to the extent possible, direct federal intervention—and to limit the financial impact of civil defense planning—by distributing civil defense functions among a range of
public and private actors, and by devising systems for coordinated planning and response in the event of an emergency.\textsuperscript{12}

In the framework of emergency federalism laid out in United States Civil Defense, the basic principle for the distribution of responsibility was self-protection. Civil defense, the report held, was first of all incumbent upon individuals and families, and upon the governmental institutions that were closest to the individual and the community (NSRB 1950, 4). The key actors in civil defense would not, thus, be members of a new bureaucracy of federal officials. Rather, they would be local fire and police services, local health agencies, and local government officials, who would incorporate civil defense planning into their routine activities. “Civil defense rests,” the report argued,

upon the principle of self-protection by the individual, extended to include mutual self-protection on the part of groups and communities. Manned largely by unpaid part-time volunteer workers, each service of civil defense will work in cooperation with the others for the common good. All men and women who make up these services will belong to a national team—The United States Civil Defense Corps. (NSRB 1950, 3)

The argument for emergency federalism in United States Civil Defense then proceeded in the classical style of liberal political thought. Having begun from the individual and local government as the basic bearers of rights and responsibilities, the report proceeded to ask in what cases it would be justified to qualify the right to self-government and the burden of self-protection through intervention by states and by the federal government. For example, the report argued that some situations would overwhelm the capacity of individuals or families to provide themselves with adequate sustenance (a function that was notably not considered a normal responsibility of the state):

Under wartime disaster conditions, many self-sustaining families and individuals may suddenly find that they have to depend temporarily on others for even the simplest essentials of life. After a disaster, a family may be left on the street without housing or adequate clothing, with no place to eat, wash, or sleep, with no means of transportation and perhaps without money or the ability to care for immediate needs. (NSRB 1950, 69)

Consequently, emergency welfare services were required to assist families in such situations, and were a necessary part of civil defense plans.

Likewise, communities and local governments would be unable to deal with the overwhelming devastation of a nuclear attack. “No community,” the report maintained, “could afford the establishment of complete self-sufficiency” (NSRB 1950, 45). Nor would such self-sufficiency be practical, since “surplus resources unnecessary in peacetime would be vulnerable to destruction in event of attack” (NSRB 1950, 45). For these reasons, the principle of
local self-protection could be supplemented by a system of support from other governmental entities. Such a program would meet the demands of economy, “because it does not call for a tremendous procurement program, or an unusual drain on men, money, and materials. Instead, it provides for the organized use of existing equipment, following the principle that location is more important than quantity” (NSRB 1950, 4).

*United States Civil Defense* proposed two kinds of coordinated response that would bring aid to communities whose capacities were overwhelmed: “mutual aid” and “mobile response.” (See figure 6.1.) Mutual aid was defined as “voluntary arrangements by which the protective services of organized communities assist each other in time of need, usually on the basis of prior planning and voluntary contractual agreements between communities” (NSRB 1950, 45). It was a form of “horizontal” coordination through which adjacent communities would be organized collectively in the event of an attack. The report noted that many informal mutual aid agreements already existed. The task was to formalize these agreements, and to develop mutual aid plans that could be “tested in practice” so that, in an emergency, “the mutual-aid forces [could] be established with precision and speed” (NSRB 1950, 47).

Mobile support, by contrast, was aid “directed by State authority into a stricken area” (NSRB 1950, 45). It expressed, in this sense, not an obligation established by agreement between equals but an obligation of the government to protect individual citizens and communities. Mobile support was envisioned as a vertically organized emergency standby capacity provided by “self-contained services or teams” that would provide specialized aid in areas such as rescue, first aid, emergency feeding, radiological and chemical defense, engineering, and police and fire services (NSRB 1950, 47). The primary responsibility for such mobile support was borne by state governments. But the report also postulated a role for the federal government.13 State governments might request that the military provide “assistance where possible in the event of war-caused disasters” (NSRB 1950, 16).

The broad picture that emerges is a framework for coordination in a federal system—one with a distinctive temporal structure. During normal periods planning would be conducted through cooperation among different agencies within the U.S. federal system. In the case of events that overwhelmed local capacities, however, unified structures of command and coordination would be established. This model for dealing with emergency situations did not involve the suspension of legality or civilian rule (although the report noted that there might be circumstances in which martial law would be declared after a nuclear attack). Rather, it called for temporarily establishing a unified command to “meet the exigencies of a given situation (Lee 2001, 49).”

But emergency federalism was only a formal administrative framework. The questions that then arose were: what kinds of mutual aid would be necessary in the event of attack? What kinds of mobile support should be orga-
Figure 6.1 Mutual Aid and Mobile Support Pattern.
nized, and where? In other words, emergency federalism, with its distinctive organizational and temporal structure, had to be given spatial and substantive form.

**Vulnerability Mapping**

In order to apply the principles of emergency federalism to a given city, it was necessary to understand what response capacities would be required in the event of an attack. *United States Civil Defense* and subsequent planning documents proposed a set of techniques for doing so, which we refer to collectively as “vulnerability mapping.” Vulnerability mapping produced a new form of spatial knowledge about cities—as sites of potential future disaster and as complex spaces of response. Civil defense planning documents gave technical instructions for producing maps that visually juxtaposed an attack’s projected impact against the existing infrastructure of an urban area. Using these maps, planners could assess weaknesses in existing response capacities and determine where resources would have to be directed to improve civil defense preparedness.

**Imaginative Enactment and Urban Analysis**

Vulnerability mapping was based on a new understanding of urban life. As opposed to statistical knowledge about the condition of the population, such as epidemiology or demography, this form of knowledge was not archival—it did not track the regular occurrence of predictable events over time. Rather, vulnerability mapping generated knowledge about events—such as a surprise nuclear attack—whose probability could not be known, but whose consequences could be catastrophic. Such knowledge entailed not the calculation of probabilities but rather the imaginative enactment of events for which civil defense services would have to be prepared, and the detailed analysis of how urban features would be affected by such events.¹⁵

As described in *United States Civil Defense*, the starting point for this new form of knowledge was to envision enemy strategy in a nuclear attack. Imagining the enemy mind-set was not, of course, a new problem. But before the era of total war, anticipating the intentions of the enemy had been important mainly for planning theater operations—that is, force deployments and strategies of attack. In an era of strategic bombing, the question shifted: how did the enemy conceptualize the features of U.S. territory as a set of targets?

*United States Civil Defense* assumed that a potential attacker would plan an attack based on the same principles of strategic bombing that were at the center of U.S. Air Force doctrine. As the report put it,

The considerations which determine profitable targets are understood by potential enemies as well as our own planners. Such considerations include total population, density of population, concentration of impor-
tant industries, location of communication and transportation centers, location of critical military facilities, and location of civil governments. (NSRB 1950, 8)

Once a likely target had been identified, an attack scenario could then be imaginatively enacted in order to analyze its likely impact and the capacities that would be required for response. As an illustration, *United States Civil Defense* provided a “hypothetical attack problem.” (See figure 6.2.)

The hypothetical attack problem was a scenario developed through an “attack narrative” (NSRB 1950, 117). This narrative described two atomic detonations over an imaginary city x: one an air burst at twenty-four hundred feet, and one an underwater burst. The narrative then laid out the immediate impact of the attack: the water surge and lethal cloud of radioactive mist from the underwater burst; the explosive impact of the air burst and the flash fires that spread out up to a mile from ground zero; the casualties, including 14,000–17,000 from “mechanical injury” (that is, from the blast itself), 7,000–8,000 burn cases, and 1,000–3,000 cases of radiation sickness from the air burst. The attack narrative also included a description of the immediate damage that would be inflicted on communications, transportation, utilities, and medical facilities.

Such information allowed planners in given civil defense–related services—such as transportation planning, medical response, and so on—to prepare for the specific challenges they might face in the event of an attack. “The hypothetical attack problem,” *United States Civil Defense* instructed, “should be realistic in order to bring out planning requirements in all segments of civil defense operations. The planners should accept the assumed effects, and analyze their needs accordingly” (NSRB 1950, 114). The hypothetical attack problem, thus, provided a kind of test that allowed the groups involved in civil defense planning to assess “the details of their plans drawn thus far, in accordance with the conditions stated in the attack hypothesis, so that each segment of the plan can be modified as needed in the light of the problem” (NSRB 1950, 114).

The question then was, how would these techniques be applied in a specific urban setting? A series of technical manuals published by the Federal Civil Defense Authority gave local officials detailed instructions on how, concretely, to engage in vulnerability mapping in a given city. Here we consider a 1953 manual entitled *Civil Defense Urban Analysis (CDUA)* (FCDA 1953). This manual was intended to help local planners develop flexible mapping tools to be used in contingency planning. It allowed local planners to produce a spatialized assessment of the impact of a nuclear attack, one that could be used by civil defense services to plan their response.

The manual exemplifies a new understanding of urban existence as *under threat*. Civil defense authorities saw that in the era of total war, the very sys-
tems that had been developed to support modern urban life were now sources of vulnerability and, as such, likely targets of enemy attack. Health facilities, systems of transportation and communication, and urban hygiene systems—whose construction had been essential to modern social welfare provision—were now understood in a new light, as possible targets and as necessary aspects of any emergency response.
In order to conduct an “urban analysis,” it was initially necessary to catalogue the city’s features. As the manual put it, “Since the primary purpose of a civil defense urban analysis is to provide the tools for undertaking realistic civil defense planning, all pertinent aspects of the city must be considered” (FCDA 1953, 1).1 The manual listed these “pertinent aspects” in a table of forty-seven “urban features.” These features included patterns of land use, building density, industrial plants, population distribution, police stations, the water distribution system, the electric power system, streets and highways, streetcars, port facilities, the telephone system, hospitals, zoos, penal institutions, underground openings (caves and mines), topography, and prevailing winds (FCDA 1953, 66–77).

The table indicated relevant sources of information about these features and the specific details of each to be included in civil defense planning. It also pointed to the “significance” of these features for specific areas of civil defense planning. Thus, for example, information about land use could help both in estimating possible damage to urban facilities and in mapping the distribution of population—which was crucial, as we will see below, to assessing likely casualties from a blast. Industrial plants were significant as possible targets of sabotage or bombing, and as important elements in police and fire control planning. Many features had a “double” character: not only were they crucial in understanding the impact of an attack, but they were also understood to play a critical role in response. Water distribution systems were a potential target of sabotage and might be destroyed or disabled by a nuclear blast; they were also critical to fire control plans and were needed for emergency provision for attack victims and civil defense workers. Likewise, streets and subways were potential targets, particularly at vulnerable points such as bridges and tunnels. At the same time, they served as routes for evacuation, mutual aid, and support; and subway stations could be used as bomb shelters.

Producing Maps

After cataloguing these urban features, the next step for local civil defense planners was to develop maps for use by specific urban services in developing their own contingency plans. To make these maps, planners selected and spatially juxtaposed the features of the city that would be relevant to specific civil defense services in the event of an attack. As the manual put it,

All related features needed for general civil defense planning operations or for use by one particular service (fire, police, etc.) should, if practicable, be assembled on one map. The various features represented are dissimilar but are significant because of their interrelationship. For example, one particular street may be important as an emergency route because bordering buildings are not sufficiently high to block the street with rubble in event of their destruction by bomb blast. (FCDA 1953, 8)
The production of these maps proceeded through three steps. First, local governments were to undertake a target analysis to determine the enemy’s “assumed aiming point.” Second, they were to use mapping techniques to estimate the impact of strikes on all features of a city related to the organization of response. Finally, on the basis of this assessment, local governments, state governments, and emergency response services would develop detailed contingency plans. These plans could then be tested through exercises to identify weakness in preparation, practice response, direct resources to the most serious vulnerabilities, and develop a plan for “emergency federalist” coordination with other localities and with state and federal governments.

The first step—the target analysis—sought to determine where a rational enemy would target an attack in order to cause the most possible damage. To find this “assumed aiming point,” planners were instructed to place a transparent acetate overlay with regularly spaced concentric circles on top of a map of industrial facilities and population concentrations. Each circle marked a zone in which the impact of a blast would be felt with a common intensity. Damage from the blast in each zone could be estimated using information from a document that had been prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S. Department of Defense, called The Effects of Atomic Weapons (U.S. Scientific Laboratory, 1950). This document, based on data gathered in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, provided tables indicating blast damage from a nuclear strike at various distances from ground zero. By positioning the acetate overlay on top of different possible targets on the map, the planner could test out different aiming points to determine which would cause maximum destruction.

The point of identifying an assumed aiming point was not to predict the exact location of an attack. As the manual notes, the target was not precisely known, and, in any case, the enemy might miss. Rather, the goal was to determine the maximum possible damage from an attack to ensure that response plans were “sufficiently broad and flexible to meet all possible conditions” (FCDA 1953, 8). Once the assumed aiming point was determined, it served as “a logical center for the pattern of civil defense ground organization of the community as a whole” (FCDA 1953, 10).

The second step in developing vulnerability maps was to estimate the damage a given sized bomb, hitting a certain point, would inflict on significant urban features. These included not only the potential targets of enemy attack, but also those features relevant to emergency response. CDUA divided significant urban features in two categories: facilities and population. In the case of facilities, the factors determining damage were the size of the blast itself and possible damage from an ensuing firestorm. Physical damage from the blast was estimated by using the acetate overlay method in combination with a table—provided in CDUA—that indicated the amount of damage to structures made from various materials in specific blast zones (FCDA 1953).
Fire damage depended on such factors as building density, construction materials, precipitation, and wind velocity.  

To map the city’s probable number and distribution of casualties, planners were to represent the distribution of the population in the city at the time of attack on a map, based on estimates of daytime migration patterns. This preparatory map was then paired with a table (provided by the FCDA) of the estimated percentage of fatalities and nonfatal injuries in a zone. Using this table and the acetate overlay method, the planner would then “record the fatal casualties, nonfatal casualties and uninjured as calculated for each ring and for the various bomb sizes” (FCDA 1953, 36). With this information, the planner could generate “isorithmic maps”: sets of lines on a city map indicating the areas of concentric zones of A-, B-, C-, and D-damage.
number of fatalities in a given sector. These maps brought urban populations into view as a spatially distributed set of casualty figures, so that plans could be developed to provide relief in the wake of an attack, such as emergency medical and housing services.

The third and final step in the map-making process was to juxtapose selected features on maps to be used by the various services that would be engaged in response to an attack. CDUA noted,

Each service should be given a map of the overall defense pattern of the city (web defense map or other) and an emergency street and highway map developed by the engineering services which shows the traffic control and evacuation assembly plan. In addition, each service should be furnished specific maps and information pertinent to their operations. (FCDA 1953, 50)

These maps not only estimated the physical damage of a likely blast and the casualties that would result from it. More importantly, they indicated the spatial distribution of physical damage and casualties over the existing structure of the city, providing information for civil defense services that would guide contingency planning. For example, information about damage to streets and highways, or general information about the spatial distribution of casualties, might be provided to engineering departments and “incorporated in the general civil defense transportation map” (FCDA 1953, 53). Evacuation routes would thus be planned on the basis of the likely volume of evacuees over certain routes. Planners could also carefully examine these routes to determine areas where fallen buildings or trees might block exit routes, and plan alternatives accordingly. Isorithmic maps of casualties, meanwhile, would show “at a glance where the people are in the city and [would be] especially valuable for estimating shelter needs and the probable distribution of casualties and uninjured-unhoused.” These maps would also identify critical vulnerabilities in systems of response. “For example,” CDUA noted,

one police station may house all of the police broadcasting equipment and one electric station may have the only available transformer which can change voltage from a distant source of electrical power to the voltage used for distribution through the city. (FCDA 1953,12)

Vulnerability mapping also enabled local planners to apply the framework of emergency federalism to the specific needs of a given community in a likely attack scenario, effectively bringing the process of civil defense planning full circle. Using vulnerability maps, civil defense services could assess their own capacities and determine requirements for mutual aid and mobile support. As United States Civil Defense summarized this logic of coordinated planning, “Civil Defense is conceived as a system which will depend largely on cooperation between critical target areas and the communities around them” (NSRB 1950, 4). (See figure 6.4.)
Figure 6.4 The National Civil Defense Pattern.
This overall vision was a distinctive adaptation of the needs of civil defense in an air-nuclear age to the territorial system of governmental administration in the United States. Distributed preparedness linked emergency federalism to vulnerability mapping, grafting spatial knowledge of likely targets onto the federal organization of the U.S. government.

**Distributed Preparedness and the Politics of Contemporary Security**

In this chapter, we have described distributed preparedness as a novel political logic of collective security that emerged in the context of superpower confrontation during the early Cold War. In conclusion, we briefly track the subsequent diffusion of distributed preparedness from civil defense to other domains over the course of the period after World War II. We then consider the significance of this process for critical understandings of security after the attacks of 9/11, as distributed preparedness moved to the center of security policy in the United States.

Beginning in the mid-1950s, some local civil defense officials—skeptical about the very possibility of preparing for a nuclear attack—recognized that elements of distributed preparedness could be used to approach other possible threats, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods (FCDA 1957; Quarantelli n.d.). These officials applied the techniques of vulnerability mapping, and the emergency federalist model of coordination, to the challenges of domestic natural disaster response. In doing so, they defined a new field of expertise—“emergency management.”

During the 1970s, this field of expertise and the forms of response associated with it were institutionalized at the national level. A concern with environmental dangers such as nuclear accidents and toxic spills prompted state governments to request that governmental preparedness for various potential emergencies be centralized. In 1979, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was established to coordinate state and local response to major disasters. The new agency consolidated multiple federal emergency management and civil defense functions under the rubric of “all-hazards planning.” It extended the techniques of vulnerability mapping to deal with various possible catastrophes, including earthquakes, floods, and major industrial accidents, in addition to enemy attacks. And FEMA adopted the emergency federalist model of response coordination as well, taking shape as a small coordinative agency rather than an extensive bureaucratic organization.

Over the following two decades, while distributed preparedness crystallized as a model for federal emergency management, its logic extended into a number of new settings, both inside and outside the government, to address diverse problems such as terrorism, public health, and humanitarian emergencies. In the United States, distributed preparedness is now most visible in the Department of Homeland Security, established after the attacks of 9/11. When
FEMA was incorporated into the department in 2002, DHS inherited the techniques and organizational framework that had been developed in emergency management and civil defense, as well as FEMA’s orientation to all-hazards planning. Thus, the National Preparedness Guidance—the basic DHS strategy document released in the spring of 2005—is based on fifteen “scenarios,” including a dirty bomb attack, a major hurricane, and an influenza epidemic (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2005). Like the “hypothetical attack problem” from United States Civil Defense, these were imagined events that were to be enacted in order to determine needed response capacities, and to identify vulnerable nodes in critical response systems. The use of these scenarios would also allow U.S. territory to be mapped as a space of vulnerabilities, and so would serve as a tool for prioritizing the distribution of funds for preparedness activities among states. Thus, the novel formation of “homeland security” was at least in part a crystallization and new institutionalization of the logic of distributed preparedness.

Distributed preparedness is now central to U.S. government policy related to collective security. And it has become so during what might be considered the largest reorganization of the federal government since the 1947 National Security Act (White House 2006). As in the early Cold War, this reorganization has raised critical questions about the politics of security, and about its relationship to liberal-democratic institutions of citizenship and civilian administration.

As we noted in the introduction, a common tendency in critical scholarship has been to equate recent transformations in the organization of security with a “militarization” of the civilian sphere, and with the curtailment of civil liberties. Our analysis suggests a different critical vantage, one that begins with the premise that there are multiple types of security. From this vantage, in order to diagnose the political stakes of a given security measure, it is initially necessary to specify which type of security is in question: what is its political logic? What kinds of threats does it seek to manage, and what are its implications for welfare or civil liberties?

Our analysis indicates that the extension of distributed preparedness to new domains should not be equated with a process of “militarization.” The U.S. military has never wanted to engage in distributed preparedness—not in 1949 and not in 2006. And as we have seen, the explicit concern of those who initially developed distributed preparedness was with how preparation and response to certain kinds of security problems might take place without compromising the distributed sovereignties of American federalism and the liberal traditions of the American political system. If anything, the rise of distributed preparedness is best understood as a response to conservative apprehension about federal interference with free enterprise and local government, rather than as an erosion of the civilian sphere.
What is needed, then, is not an overarching diagnosis of “militarization” or “securitization,” but an analytics that allows us to distinguish among different processes underway in a complex field of contemporary security problems. With such an analytics, it becomes possible to distinguish among the political implications of various types of security measures. For example, some provisions in the Patriot Act and measures to allow extrajudicial detentions increase the legal power of the federal government and curtail civil liberties and protections. An approach based on distributed preparedness, by contrast, would seek to maintain the decentralized power of the U.S. federal system, and would emphasize transparency and communication across public and private actors rather than secrecy and centralization. Or, to take another example, the pursuit of increased security through attacks on foreign enemies requires military expenditures that drain resources from health and social security measures. Measures based on distributed preparedness, meanwhile, might instead draw attention to vulnerabilities that are the products of decaying infrastructure, isolated areas of poverty, or weak public health services—and would thus lead to spending that would complement social welfare efforts. In this sense, a more differentiated analysis of current security measures may point not only to salient sites of critique but also to unexpected possibilities for intervention into the politics of contemporary security.

Notes

1. We are grateful for the suggestions of the editors of this volume, Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert, as well as for comments by Carlo Caduff, Kerstin Mikalbrown, Gregoire Mallard, Paul Rabinow, and Dale Rose on an earlier draft of this chapter.
2. Michel Foucault refers to this approach as a study of problematizations (see Rabinow 2003). For a discussion of this approach in relation to security problems, see Collier, Lakoff, and Rabinow (2004), and Collier and Lakoff (2006).
3. For a discussion, see McMullen (2001); for a broader analysis of military preparations for postwar mobilization during World War II, see Sherry (1977).
4. Civil defense was not the only response to this new awareness of the United States as a target. For example, policies to promote industrial dispersion were also implemented (see Galison 2001; Light 2003).
6. For a review of these studies, see Lee (2001) “Careful Studies and Indecision.”
7. Lee (2001, 60) argues that United States Civil Defense—referred to as the “blue book”—served “as the blueprint for structuring the Federal Civil Defense administration.”
8. Hogan (1998, 210) writes that NSRB was to provide “a peacetime agency to coordinate mobilization plans across the government, assess military readiness and the availability of essential commodities, and advise the president on strategic resources and the proper balance between civilian and military requirements.”
9. The phrase is Hogan’s.
10. This coalition also involved corporate actors who had been concerned with state incursions on free enterprise during World War II. Waddell (1999, 241) writes: “The experience of war mobilization convinced key corporate leaders to value the compensatory role played by the state and to appreciate a national state apparatus tamed by the wartime influx of corporate executives. They welcomed a new era of growth based on a business-oriented Keynesianism in preference to both a mythic laissez-faire and a social Keynesianism rooted in a redistributive welfare state.”

11. These concerns were an explicit part of discussions about civil defense. Thus, Lee (2001, 37) notes, “Certainly, there were some who reacted with dismay over the prospect of an intrusive civil defense program. Not surprisingly, others objected for economic reasons.”

12. This framework of emergency federalism was one among a number of efforts after World War II to reconcile a growing state sector with the institutions of U.S. federalism. One prime example is the fiscal federal theory of James Buchanan (1949). Similar “federalist” solutions to security problems were also being worked out in domains such as health surveillance (see Fearnley 2005).

13. Discussion of the federal role in the report was substantially broader than this question of mobile support. It focused on coordination, planning, and redistribution functions. First, the federal role was needed to ensure uniformity of equipment, and to ensure that roughly standard procedures and assumptions were used for planning in various U.S. target areas. Second, the federal role was necessitated by the concern to avoid burdening critical target areas. Thus, the federal government might have a redistributive role to play in aiding communities with a disproportionate civil defense burden. Finally, the federal role was determined by the allocative problem of ensuring that minimum standards for civil defense preparation were reached in critical target areas, since, by definition, reaching such minimum standards for critical targets was a concern not merely of localities but also of the national security of the country as a whole.

14. Hopley, quoted in Lee (2001, 49), “Unified” command is different from “unitary” command in that the latter implies command and control relationships within a hierarchically organized bureaucratic structure, while the former implies only temporary concentration of decision making among entities not related to each other through bureaucratic hierarchy. Although the point cannot be developed here, this structure for approaching “emergency situations” varies very substantially from what is theoretically assumed in much contemporary literature on sovereignty and the “state of emergency” in that it does not involve a sovereign exception to normal legality. The use of a Schmittian analytic of the “state of exception” (see, for example, Agamben 2005) thus misses much of what is important in current discussions of security in the United States.

15. Ulrich Beck (1999) has argued that the proliferation of incalculable but potentially catastrophic threats is a central characteristic of the “risk society.” He notes that these threats outstrip the insurantial mechanisms developed to manage collective security problems under the aegis of welfare, and suggests that social consciousness of these new threats will lead to the mobilization of new antitechnocratic politics. However, Beck fails to note the emergence over the
period after World War II of new techniques—such as those we are describing here—for approaching these types of threats (for a discussion, see Collier and Lakoff 2006; Lakoff 2007).

16. These techniques of imaginative enactment and exercise were borrowed from military planners, who faced a similar challenge of anticipating—and preparing for—uncertain but potentially catastrophic events (Lee 2001).

17. The text also points to the need for ongoing revision of such plans in relation to new needs: “because of constant changes in the various factors, results of civil defense urban analyses must be subjected to constant review and revision with civil defense plans being altered accordingly” (FCDA 1953, 2).

18. The key question was whether a blast would become a firestorm by spreading among neighboring buildings, which would increase structural damage considerably.

19. The “uninjured-unhoused” were those whose housing had been destroyed and who therefore needed emergency shelter but were otherwise unharmed. Nonfatal casualty figures provided an estimation of the needs for hospital beds and other emergency medical services (FCDA 1953, 40).

20. As a leading figure in the field put it, “At the national level, a civil defense system developed earlier than any comparable disaster planning or emergency management system. However, at the local level, the prime concern after World War II became to prepare for and respond to disasters” (Quarantelli n.d., 10).

21. For examples of this impulse in the literature, see the special issue of *Theory, Culture, and Society* 19 (4) 2002; as well as Graham (2004) and Light (2002).

22. This conservative apprehension about distributed preparedness may be reflected in the Bush administration’s lack of enthusiasm for homeland security.

References


Lee’s chapter “Careful Studies and Indecision.”